St. John's Law Review
Volume 39, December 1964, Number 1

Article 36

When Supreme Court Retains Jurisdiction of Family Court Matter
It Must Apply Procedures of Family Court Act
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1964 ]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

the complaint without using 3the language "hereby appears" in
conjunction with the demand.
When supreme court retains jurisdiction of family court matter it
must apply procedures of Family Court Act.
The apparent conflict between two provisions of the recent
court reorganization amendment to the New York State Constitution"' has recently been treated by the appellate division,
fourth department.
In People v. Delesus, 5 the defendanthusband was indicted in the supreme court for assaulting his wife
by cutting her face with a razor blade. Thereafter, the proceeding
was transferred to the county court where defendant was arraigned.
Upon arraignment, the court granted defendant's motion to transfer
the proceeding to the family court" pursuant to Section 813 of
the Family Court Act.97 An appeal by the District Attorney was
dismissed on the ground that the order of transfer was not appealable because not final. But the court took the occasion to treat
the merits of the appeal because of the confusion existing in.
this important area of jurisdiction.
In its opinion, the fourth department discussed at length the
principles concerning the jurisdiction of the supreme court with
respect to family court matters. The court indicated that if a
petition were presented to the supreme court on a matter which
should have been initiated in the family court, the supreme court
could retain the matter, but would be required to act as a
family court and follow the processes and procedures of the
Family Court Act. 98
Section 13(b) of Article 6 of the New York Constitution directs that proceedings arising from crimes and offenses between
93

An extensive treatment of appearance under -the CPLR and the impact
of the 1964 Amendment of CPLR 320(b) appears in 7B MCKINN y's CPLR
3211,94 supp. commentary 49-55 (1964).
The court reorganization amendment is the new N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6,
which became effective September 1, 1962.
9521 App. Div. 2d 236, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317 (4th Dep't 1964).
96 "The Family Court is a unique court... It is primarily a social court
designed to handle the complex problems of family life. . . . The court
was set up in such a way so that it would best serve the needs of the public
without the complexities and entanglements of technical requirements. It
is a court to which a layman may come for the purpose of seeking relief without counsel." Matter of Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 827, 831, 238 N.Y.S.2d
792, 7796 (Family Ct 1962).
9 Section 813 provides in part: "any criminal complaint charging disorderly conduct or an assault between spouses . . . shall be transferred by
the criminal court in which complaint was made to the family court in
the 9county in which the criminal court is located...
s People v. Dejesus, 21 App. Div. 2d 236, 239, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (4th
Dep't 1964).
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spouses "shall be originated"9 in the family court. In addition,
Section 812 of the Family Court Act provides that the family court
has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over any proceeding arising
out of assaults between spouses. When read together, the constitutional provision and the statute appear to mandate that spouse
assaults and other enumerated family proceedings originate
exclusively in the family court. However, N.Y. State Const. art.
6, § 7(c) provides that the supreme court shall have jurisdiction
over any new classes of actions and proceedings created by the
legislature. It is also provided by the Constitution that the supreme
court "shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity
100 which jurisdiction neither the legislature nor the
courts have power to limit.10 1 Thus, the question arises as to
what happens when a matter which should have been initiated in
the family court is commenced, rather, in the supreme court. The
ordinary procedure is for the supreme court to transfer such matter
to the appropriate family court. 0 2 But what happens if the supreme court chooses to retain the matter? In this situation there
exists an apparent conflict among the relevant constitutional provisions and statutes.
The appellate division directed its attention to this conflict and
stated that sections 7(c) and 13 of article 6 must "of necessity be
construed together. 1 0 3 Thus, if the supreme court chooses to
retain subject matter which should preferably have been brought
in the family court it must then act as a family court and utilize
the procedures of the Family Court Act. By such a conclusion,
the appellate division was able to effectuate the salutary purpose of
applying the specially devised procedures of the family court to
any court in which a family court matter may technically be
brought, while preserving the Constitution's aim of keeping omnibus
jurisdiction in the supreme court. While this may appear to
weaken the traditionally strong attitude against a whittling away
of the supreme court's general jurisdiction, as expressed in many
prior cases,"' 4 the opinion must be recognized as giving to the
99 Courts have held that the word "shall" is mandatory language-and
not permissive-when the interpretation of a constitutional provision is involved. See People v. Dejesus, "spranote 98, at 239, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 322
and cases cited therein.
100 N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 7(a).
1013505 Realty Corp. v. Weinberger, 41 Misc. 2d 254, 245 N.Y.S.2d 150
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
102 See People v. Dejesus, supra note 98, at 239-40, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
The supreme court is authorized constitutionally and by statute to transfer
such cases. See, e.g., N.Y. CoxsT. art. 6, § 19(a); N.Y. FAMmY CT. AcT
§ 813.
103 People v. Dejesus, supra note 98, at 239, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
104See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art 6, §§7(a), 13(d); N.Y. JUDiCIARY LAW
§ 140-b; Barone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 410, 414, 183 N.E. 900, 901
(1933); Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N.Y. 204 (1875); Decker v. Canzoneri,
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family court the due that the Constitution had in mind for it.
The family court emerges wholly new from the recent constitutional
article, and the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization was at pains to implement the article to effectuate the broad
purposes it had in mind for the family court. It did this in the
Family Court Act. Should the supreme court retain jurisdiction
of a matter cognizable in the family court, the fourth department
opinion states the supreme court would be required constitutionally
to follow the procedures of the Family Court Act. This appears
to compromise the apparent conflict without upsetting the principle
of broad jurisdiction inherent in the supreme court.
ARTICLE 10

-

PARTIES GENERALLY

Judgment against non-appealing third party plaintiff reversed
on appeal taken by third party defendant.
In Rome Cable Corp. v. Tanney,105 an employer commenced
an action against its employee to recover the amount it had paid
a third person in settlement of a claim arising out of the employee's
alleged negligence. The employee impleaded' 0 6 the third person's
employer, who became the third party defendant in the action. The
trial court rendered a judgment for the employer against the
employee, and for the employee against the third party defendant.
The third party defendant was the only one to appeal. The appellate division, fourth department, reversed, and held that the
third party defendant could challenge infirmities of plaintiff's judg"
ment against the third party plaintiff in the main action, even
though the third party plaintiff had not appealed from the judgment against him. Furthermore, since the plaintiff in the main
action had failed to make out a prima facie case with respect to its
right to indemnity from the defendant (third party plaintiff), the
judgment against the latter would also be reversed.
Under CPA § 193-a(2) the third party defendant had the
right to appeal from the judgment in the main action, even though
the defendant in the main action had not appealed. Today, the
essence of CPA § 193-a(2) is incorporated into CPLR 1008.
The interesting aspect of the Rome case is that the judgment
was reversed as to the third party plaintiff, who had not appealed
from the judgment entered against him. The Rome case is in
256 App. Div. 68, 72, 9 N.Y.S.2d 210, 215 (3d Dep't 1939). But see Jones
v. Reilly, 68 App. Div. 116, 74 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1st Dep't 1902) and Janks
v. Braveman, 188 Misc. 373, 67 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct 1947).
10521 App. Div. 2d 342, 250 N.Y.S.2d 304 (4th Dep't 1964).
'10 CPLR 1007 gives the defendant the right to proceed against a person
who is not a party in the action, when the party "may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him...."

